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Notes
An Economic Analysis of the 1982 Justice Department
Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers
On June 14, 1982, the Justice Department released new
guidelines1 describing the standards the Department will use
to determine which mergers it will challenge under section 7 of
the Clayton Act 2 and section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 These new
Guidelines, which replace the 1968 Justice Department Guide-
lines, purport to reflect the Justice Department's announced
objective of opposing only those mergers that create or en-
hance market power,4 or facilitate its exercise.5 The Guide-
lines' emphasis on challenging mergers creating or enhancing
market power reveals the Department's desire to protect all
mergers that do not noticeably threaten competition.6 Conse-
1. Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice, 2 TRA E REG. REP.
(CCH) % 4500 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
2. Section 7 of the Clayton Act states:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital... [or] ... assets of another person engaged
also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any
line of commerce or any activity affecting commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4. Market power exists when a firm or group of firms can profitably main-
tain a selling price above the competitive level. In the absence of market
power, a firm that increased prices above the competitive level would lose cus-
tomers to other firms and have lower profits. Thus, any firm can raise prices
above the competitive level, but only those with market power can maintain
these higher prices profitably. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HAhv. L. REv. 937, 937 (1981). See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNE I,
ANTiTRUsT LAW 501 (1978); C. KAYSEN & D. TunNER, ANTrTRUST PoucY 75
(1959).
5. Guidelines, supra note 1, 4501.
6. See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4501. This desire to protect economi-
cally efficient mergers reflects the current Justice Department view that eco-
nomic efficiency is the goal of U.S. antitrust policy, a view which has also
surfaced in the Sixth Circuit. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378,
381 (6th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). Judge, then Professor, Rich-
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quently, in contrast to the 1968 Guidelines, which almost exclu-
sively relied on firm concentration and market share data, the
new Guidelines take into account a wide array of structural and
behavioral factors.
The view that economic efficiency should be a principal
concern of merger policy is a relatively recent development; en-
forcement traditionally attempted to protect competition
through policies aimed at assuring a large number of small
competitors in the market.7 This traditional approach to merger
analysis is evident in the Supreme Court's early decisions
under the amended section 7, decisions evincing hostility to
any horizontal merger that created more than a de minimis in-
crease in concentration in the relevant market.8 Like the dis-
carded .1968 Guidelines, these early cases focused almost
exclusively on concentration ratios and market shares to assess
the competitive effect of a horizontal merger.
Prior to the development of the new Guidelines, the Burger
Court appeared to have adopted a more sophisticated approach
to merger analysis that emphasized the effect of a proposed
merger on competition rather than on competitors. 9 This new
approach continues to rely on market share analysis, but such
analysis no longer ends the inquiry if the proponent of the
merger can offer evidence of other structural characteristics
that lessen the significance of market shares.10
The shift in judicial focus unveiled by the Burger Court,
coupled with the relatively few merger cases it has decided, has
left merger law in an unsettled state. For example, the kinds of
ard Posner maintains that this current emphasis on "efficiency" illustrates the
general acceptance of the "Chicago School" of economic thought. Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932 (1979).
7. In debating the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section 7, which
tightened the restrictions on mergers, Congress evinced a view of merger law
as a means of protecting small businesses from takeovers by corporate giants.
See 95 CONG. REc. 11494-95 (1949). Professor Derek Bok noted that the "curious
aspect of the debates [was] the paucity of remarks having to do with the effects
of concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and efficiency." Bok, Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L
REV. 226, 236 (1960). But see 95 CONG. REc. 11493 (1949) (statement of Mr. Yates
that oligopolists might "adopt a live-and-let-live policy toward each other at the
sacrifice of their efficiency and their progress").
8. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
9. See Sullivan, Antitrus Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on
Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALm_. L. REV. 1, 2 (1980).
10. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974).
See also infra text accompanying notes 75-77 (court considers history and prob-
able future of competition in the industry) and note 189 (showing the ambigu-
ity in the Supreme Court approach to mergers).
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evidence that will overcome a showing of undue concentration
and market shares caused by a merger still remain unresolved.
Similarly, the extent of concentration caused by a merger that
will give rise to a prima facie case is not clear. The absence of
guidelines in the cases, together with the lack of a definitive
economic theory to assess the effects of a merger, enabled the
Justice Department to exercise a great deal of discretion in
drafting its own standards for identifying those mergers it
deems to be anticompetitive. Businesses that dispute the De-
partment's assessment of a merger therefore will have almost
no Supreme Court decisions on which to rely and, conse-
quently, will have no recognized alternative to the Depart-
ment's method of analysis. Thus, the 1982 Merger Guidelines
take on particular significance; the Department's method of
analysis, rather than one defined by the courts, will invariably
be the yardstick by which all potential mergers are measured.
Specifically, this Note examines the horizontal merger as-
pects of the 1982 Justice Department Guidelines.'1 Part I ex-
plains the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of
industrial organization and examines the applications and limi-
tations of economic theory to merger analysis. Part II reviews
the 1968 Guidelines and the need to replace them, while Part
I assesses the new Guidelines and their basis in economic
theory. Part III concludes that the 1982 Guidelines tend to ob-
scure rather than illuminate those mergers that are potentially
anticompetitive, thus offering little guidance for firms seeking
to avoid antitrust litigation. Part IV offers an alternative to the
1982 Guidelines, based on more readily available information,
more relevant economic theory, and more realistic assumptions
regarding management behavior.
I. THE APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF
ECONOMICS TO MERGER ANALYSIS
A horizontal merger may benefit society by increasing eco-
nomic efficiency,12 it may have no net effect on societal wel-
11. This lote does not address the market definition difficulties with the
1982 Guidelines. See infra notes 165, 172. Rather, it examines the issues inher-
ent in an application of the Guidelines' horizontal merger analysis to a pro-
posed merger where the market has been agreed upon or defined. Errors in the
market definition enter this analysis only to the extent that the new Guidelines
may compound the effects of such errors. See infra notes 165-69 and accompa-
nying text.
12. The Supreme Court has recognized that a horizontal merger may in-
crease efficiency by allowing two small firms to merge into a firm more capable
of competing with larger rivals. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
1983]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
fare, 13 or it may cause detrimental effects by facilitating
collusion and the exercise of market power. Section 7 of the
Clayton Act is designed to prevent mergers of the last type-
those which tend to "lessen competition" or "create a monop-
oly."14 Consequently, merger analysis is useful only to the ex-
tent it can accurately predict the postmerger competitiveness
of an industry from data available before the merger occurs. In
the language of economic theorists, this predictive process in-
volves three aspects of industrial organization: structure, con-
duct, and performance. 5
The "market structure" of an industry refers to external
conditions that affect the way a firm determines output and
price.16 These conditions include the number and size of firms
in the industry, barriers to entry, cost functions, and product
differentiation. 7 "Conduct" refers to firm behavior, or the
types of output and pricing decisions the firm makes.18 Exam-
ples of conduct include competitive pricing, price fixing, and ty-
ing agreements.19  "Performance" refers to the results of
294, 319 (1962). For example, assume two small beer producers compete in the
same market area against, among others, larger firms. By merging into one
firm, the companies may economize on expenses associated with management,
purchasing, advertising, research, production, and marketing. Although the
beer industry for this area would have one less competitor after the merger, the
new firm, with lower costs, may offer greater competition to the larger firms
and thus result in lower prices for consumers. Such cost savings are referred
to as "efficiencies." See D. AnmENTANo, ANTrRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY
OF A POUCY FAILURE 232 (1982). See also Williamson, Economies as an Anti-
trust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18 (1968) (asserting
that the efficiencies of some mergers may outweigh their anticompetitive
impacts).
13. No net effect on societal welfare means, in the economic sense, that the
industry is neither more efficient nor more prone to the exercise of market
power and collusion after the merger. Although the neutral efficiency impact of
a merger may result from management's inaccurate estimates of resulting effi-
ciencies, such mergers might also be motivated by considerations unrelated to
efficiency or monopoly, such as income tax or income-tax-related estate-plan-
ning reasons. See R. POSNER, ANTrrRuST 397-98 (1974).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 2.
15. See D. NEEDHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, CONDUCT
AND PERFORMANCE 1-3 (1978); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3-6 (2d ed. 1980).
16. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at 59.
17. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 4. Barriers to entry are factors which
affect the relative difficulty that a new firm encounters in entering the industry.
See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPUCATIONS 351-53 (4th ed.
1982). Product differentiation refers to consumers perceiving the relative value
of a product differently, so that some consumers are willing to pay more for a
given product or brand than other consumers. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15,
at 375-76.
18. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at 59.
19. See id. at 59.
[Vol. 67:749
MERGER GUIDELINES
market interaction in a given industry and whether that out-
come is socially desirable.20 It entails an examination into such
market results as the relation of price to costs in an industry,
responsiveness of price to changes in demand or supply, ade-
quacy of resources allocated to an industry, and the condition
of technology employed by an industry.2 1 Performance goals
include efficient use of resources, progress, stable growth, and
an equitable distribution of income.22
This basic paradigm of industrial organization holds that
there is a causal relationship between structure and conduct,
and between conduct and performance in an industry.23 Under
this theory, market structure, together with the basic condi-
tions of supply and demand, limits the range of possible con-
duct which, ultimately, will affect industry performance.24 If an
industry contains many small firms producing the same prod-
uct (structure), then the firms will compete because of the diffi-
culty of collusion among so many firms (conduct), and the
industry will produce the socially desirable output and charge
a price equal to cost (performance). If, on the other hand, an
industry contains only five firms (structure), these firms may
realistically conspire together to fix prices (conduct), which
will result in supracompetitive prices and restricted output
(performance) .25
Economics provides accurate predictions about likely firm
20. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 3-4.
21. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 22 (1977).
22. Professors Kaysen and Turner list the performance goals as:
(1) efficiency in the use of resources-the achievement of the largest
bundle of desired outputs from the available bundle of resources;
(2) progress--growth of total output and of output per head and de-
velopment of new cheaper production methods and new improved
products;
(3) stability in output and employment-growth at a relatively stable
rate, rather than with large fluctuations; and
(4) an equitable distribution of income.
C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at 11. Although the performance goals
sometimes conflict with each other, the efficiency and progress goals are met
when competitive industries produce the socially optimal output and make no
economic profits. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 402.
23. See D. NEEDHAM, supra note 15, at 1-3; F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at
3-6.
24. See D. NEEDHAM, supra note 15, at 1-3; F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at
3-6.
25. Assume that CP represents the competitive price and dd represents
the market demand curve in Figure 1. If the industry contains many small
firms acting competitively, the firms will charge CP and sell E units of the good.
If the market contains only five firms and they collude and fix the price at FP,
then only 0 units of the good will be sold. See P. WomNAcorr & R. WO NNAcO r,
EcoNoMIcs 50-51 (1979).
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behavior and thus about likely industry performance-the as-
pect of the market with which antitrust analysis is con-
cerned 26-in a perfectly competitive structure. Perfect
competition presupposes a relatively large number of small
buyers and sellers trading in the product, a homogenous prod-
uct, no barriers to entry, and perfect knowledge.2 7 With no bar-
riers to entry, new firms enter whenever economic profits
appear.28 This entry increases the quantity supplied at each
price, lowers the equilibrium price, and forces new and old
firms to use the most efficient plant size and methods. 29 Be-
cause each firm produces only a fraction of total industry out-
put, no firm will have power over price and each will realize
that its output decisions cannot affect the market price.3 0 As a
result, each firm in a competitive market will take the market
price as given and vary its output solely to maximize its profits
d
cP
d
0 E Quantity
Figure 1
26. The Supreme Court has defined "competition," the goal of the antitrust
laws, in terms of the efficiency and progress goals of performance.
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods
and services. 'The heart of our national economic policy long has been
faith in the value of competition." Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S.
231, 248. The assumption that competition is the best method of allo-
cating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bar-
gain-quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the
immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select
among alternative offers.
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978).
27. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 248-49.
28. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 13.
29. See E. MANsFIELD, supra note 17, at 254-58.
30. Economists refer to this concept as "price taking." If a firm refuses to
take the price set by the market and tries to raise the price for its product
above the market price, the firm will lose all its customers to other firms. See
E. MANSFmLD, supra note 17, at 248, 251.
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at the given price.3 1 To maximize profits, a competitive firm
will continue to produce until the marginal cost of the last item
produced equals the market price.32 As each firm in a competi-
tive market seeks to maximize profits, the total output of the in-
dustry will settle at the point where the aggregate marginal
cost curve intersects the industry demand curve.3 3 Thus, in a
competitively structured market, firms behave competitively
and produce the socially optimal output 34 at a price equal to
their economic cost.35
Economics also permits prediction about the likely behav-
ior of a monopolist. A monopoly, the structure opposite that of
perfect competition, exists when a single firm produces the en-
tire industry output, no perfect substitutes for the monopoly
product are available, and substantial barriers prevent entry by
other firms 36 Since one firm controls the entire industry out-
put, it will recognize that it has power to alter the market price
by varying its output. In an effort to maximize profits, the mo-
nopolist will restrict output to achieve a price which will clear
the market at a point on its demand curve above its marginal
costs. 3 7 Thus, a monopoly virtually dictates market behavior
resulting in restricted output and prices in excess of marginal
costs. Monopoly performance results in a welfare loss, since
buyers are willing to pay more for the last unit of output than
31. See id. at 214-16, 251.
32. Id. at 214-16.
33. Id. at 251-55.
34. Economists define the socially optimal output as that output where the
amount that someone is willing to pay for the last unit of output equals the ad-
ditional cost incurred to produce that unit. See id. at 447-49; P. WoNNAcoTr & R.
WONNACOmr, supra note 25, at 437-41, 463-65.
35. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 254-58, 447-49.
36. See C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, MCROECONOMIC THEORY 259-61 (1975).
37. A monopolist maximizes profits where marginal revenue (MR) equals
marginal cost (MC). In Figure 2, marginal revenue equals marginal costs at an
output of Q units. The monopolist charges a price of P, has total costs repre-
sented by area OEBQ, and enjoys profits of PABE. See E. MANILD, supra
note 17, at 281-84.
1983]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the cost to the monopolist of producing it.38
Economists can measure the existence of market power,
and thus gauge the likely performance effects in an industry
structured according to the competitive or monopoly model, us-
ing a formula suggested by Professor A. P. Lerner.39 The Ler-
ner index measures market power by the divergence between
price and marginal cost as a percentage of price.4 0 Although
marginal cost is usually impossible to determine,41 the Lerner
Price d
p A
MC
ATC
0 Q S Quantity
Figure 2
38. A deadweight loss or social welfare loss results because 
the monopolist
reduced output below the competitive output by S 
- Q. See Figure 2, supra
note 37. The amount of allocative inefficiency or welfare 
loss is the amount by
which the willingness to pay for this output (S - Q ) exceeds the cost of produc-
ing it. In Figure 2, the area under the demand curve 
from A to D represents
the willingness to pay for the additional output while 
the area under the nmargi-
nal cost curve from C to D is the additional cost. The 
welfare loss, the amount
by which willingness to pay exceeds the cost, is the 
area of triangle CAD. See
P. WONNACOT & R. WONNACOr, supra note 25, at 438-41.
With an accurate estimate of the demand and marginal 
cost curves, one
could calculate the welfare loss as the area between these 
curves for the output
from Q to S in Figure 2. Practically speaking, however, such estimates 
cannot
be made with accuracy. See P. WONNAcoTT & R. WONNACOTr, 
supra note 25, at
409-12; Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers 
Have Standing to Sue
Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois 
Bricl4
46 U. Cm. L. Ra. 602, 61920 (1979).
39. See Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monop-
oy Power, 1 Rav. ECON. STUD. 157, 169 (1934).
40. Algebraically, the Lerner index (LI) equals (P - MC)/P, where P 
is
the price charged by the firm and MC is the marginal 
cost-the additional cost
incurred to produce the last unit of output. See Lerner, 
supra note 39, at 169.
The Lerner index is most accurate when the firm's marginal 
cost curve is rela-
tively flat the index tends to overstate market power 
if the marginal cost curve
is rising and to understate it if the marginal cost curve 
is falling. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 4, at 941.
41. See F. SCHERER INDUSTRIAL IaET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PER-
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index can still be derived in a competitively or monopolistically
structured market. In perfect competition, which produces the
socially optimal output, price equals marginal cost, so that the
value of the Lerner index is equal to zero. 2 In the absence of
market power, the market should perform competitively. On
the other hand, an industry with only one firm will yield a Ler-
ner index value equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of
demand, a measure of the sensitivity of quantity demanded to
changes in price.43 Where market power exists, elasticity of de-
mand will be greater than one,4 4 and the Lerner index will
yield a positive fraction, indicating that the market is perform-
ing noncompetitively because price exceeds marginal cost.
Thus, in either a perfectly competitive market or a monopoly
market, the Lerner index can be derived without computing
marginal cost, and economists therefore can predict the likely
performance of such markets.
Between perfect competition and monopoly is oligopoly,
the market structure characterized by a small number of large
firms acting interdependently. 45 While economic theory can
successfully predict firm behavior in competitive and monopo-
listic markets, no theory regarding oligopolistic behavior has
gained general acceptance, thus complicating predictions about
the likely performance of such markets.4 6 Most economists,
FORMANCE 50 (1970) (marginal cost is difficult to calculate from accounting
data).
42. Perfectly competitive firms, as price-takers, produce the level of output
where price equals marginal cost. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Consequently, price always equals marginal cost. See E. MANsFmrL), supra
note 17, at 250-54.
43. See D. NEEDHAM, supra note 15, at 27-28; Landes & Posner, supra note
4, at 940; Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The
Realemon Case, 127 U. PA. L REV. 994, 1006 (1979). A monopolist facing a rela-
tively inelastic demand has greater market power than one with a rather elastic
market demand. Since Lerner index P - = where Ed is the elasticity of
P EdwhrEdithelsiiyo
demand, lower values for the elasticity of demand (i.e., the more inelastic)
yield higher values for Lerner index of monopoly power.
44. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 961.
45. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 330.
46. A comment made by Jesse Markham twenty-five years ago remains
true today:
[E]conomic analysis may reveal with absolute precision that a given
merger reduces the number of independent sellers in a market from 11
to 10 and raises (say) the third largest seller's share of the market from
17 per cent to 20 per cent. However, economic theory cannot predict a
priori how much this affects competition, or even whether it affects
competition substantially.
Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal 43
VA. L. REv. 489, 491 (1957). See also F. ScHIEn, supra note 15, at 151-52; W.
1983]
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however, believe that oligopolists recognize their interdepen-
dence and, accordingly, take into account the reactions of their
rivals in making output or pricing decisions.47 If oligopolists
recognize their interdependence and act accordingly, they may
engage in concerted conduct to restrict output and maintain
prices, thereby replicating the performance of a monopoly.4
On the other hand, conditions may militate toward rivalry and
against collusion, so that an oligopoly will behave more like a
competitive market than a monopoly.49
Economists presume that oligopolists possess some degree
of market powerO and that there is some correlation between
the number of firms in an industry and the amount of market
power of each firm.5 1 Unlike the theories of perfect competition
and monopoly, however, no single method exists by which to
measure market power or the effect upon it by a merger in an
oligopoly. Although a Lerner index could be derived for an oli-
gopoly if each firm's marginal cost functions were known, such
data are unavailable in most cases.52 Moreover, economists
have not been able to devise a short cut to the Lerner index for
an oligopoly as they have done for monopolies,53 because a
summary measure of market power based on information taken
from the industry demand curve does not exist with respect to
an oligopoly.5 4
In short, oligopoly theory does not permit assumptions re-
SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET POWER 25-30 (1975); P. WONNAcOrr & 1.
WONNACorr, supra note 25, at 462.
47. See E. MANSFELD, supra note 17, at 330; P. WONNACOTr & R. WON-
NACOTr, supra note 25, at 482.
48. See E. MANsFiELD, supra note 17, at 344-45; P. WoNNAcoTT & I. WON-
NACOTr, supra note 25, at 482.
49. See L. SuLL AN, supra note 21, at 26.
50. See Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-
From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L REv. 285, 289 (1967).
51. See P. WONNACO'rr & R. WoNNAcorr, supra note 25, at 480. The term
"market share" should not be confused with market power. Market share re-
fers to the percentage of total industry output produced by a firm. See F.
SCHERER, supra note 15, at 56-57. Market power is the ability of a firm or group
of firms to raise price above the competitive level profitably. See supra note 4.
A large market share may increase the likelihood that the firm has some mar-
ket power, but it is not a sufficient condition. For example, barriers to entry are
also necessary. See infra text accompanying notes 182-84.
52. See F. SCHERER, supra note 41, at 50.
53. The inverse relationship between demand elasticity and the Lerner in-
dex exists only where one firm produces the entire industry demand. See
supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
54. Some economists have suggested methods of deriving a Lerner index
for an oligopoly, but these methods rely on unrealistic assumptions of conduct
and structure. See infra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
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garding performance from structure alone.55 Those oligopoly
theories that have been developed rely on various assumptions
concerning conduct, which are often unrealistic or difficult to
confirm in any particular case, in order to predict perform-
ance.5 6 Despite the limitations of economic analysis in deter-
mining the possible competitive effects of a merger of
oligopolists, the Justice Department nevertheless grounded the
1982 Merger Guidelines in economic theory, as it did the 1968
Guidelines, by focusing on the structural characteristics that
facilitate tacit or express collusion among oligopolists.
II. THE 1968 GUIDELINES AND THE IMPETUS TOWARD
NEW GUIDEINES
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,5 7 the
Supreme Court relied on a simplified structural analysis to en-
join a proposed merger between the second and third largest
commercial banks in the Philadelphia area. Philadelphia Bank
stands for the proposition that a merger creating a firm aggre-
gating an "undue" share of the market 58 and resulting in a "sig-
55. Professor George Stigler of the University of Chicago described the
ability of economics to predict oligopoly performance as follows:
Economists have their glories, but I do not believe that the body of
American antitrust law is one of them. I rest my fundamental doubts
about our influence on antitrust policy on the fact that we have pro-
vided precious little tested economic knowledge to guide policy. No
one can believe that we have established a precise relationship be-
tween concentration and market power. Doctrines such as "shared mo-
nopoly," "preemptive product differentiation," and price fixing by
interviews with the trade press, have all been proposed by economists
and antitrust agencies in the past decade. None is even agreed to gen-
erally by economists, let alone tested empirically. The prosecution and
defense both find economists to their liking, but that hardly establishes
the direction of causation.
Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, PAPERS & PROC. OF THE
94TH AHEUAL MEETING OF THE AM. EcoN. Ass'N., 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 7 (1982).
56. See generally E. MANsFIELD, supra note 17, at 330-38; F. SCHERER, supra
note 15, at 152-68 (review of oligopoly theories and their structure and conduct
assumptions). The Cournot theory assumes each oligopolist takes its competi-
tors output as given, regardless of its own output decision. See F. SCHERER,
supra note 15, at 152. The Edgeworth model assumes that each oligopolist at-
tempts to maximize profits while assuming that its competitors will keep their
price constant regardless of its pricing decisions. See E. MANsFIELD, supra note
17, at 333-35. Chamberlain attempted to correct these theories by assuming that
oligopolists considered the likely reaction of their rivals before changing price
or output, but his theory only predicts outcome when firms have identical mar-
ket shares and cost functions. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 155-60.
57. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
58. The market share of a firm refers to the percentage of total industry
output produced by that firm. See F. ScHEREn, supra note 15, at 56-57.
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nificant" increase in concentration 9 is prima facie unlawful.60
In Philadelphia Bank the proposed merger would have aggre-
gated a market share of 30 percent and produced a two-firm
concentration ratio of 59 percent, an increase of more than 33
percent.61 The focus on concentration as the measure of mar-
ket power continued throughout the 1960's as the Court struck
down mergers solely on the basis of concentration and market
share data.62 Shortly before the release of the 1968 Guidelines,
the Court decided United States v. Von's Grocery, 63 in which it
condemned a merger in which the merging firms had an aggre-
gate market share of only 7.5 percent at the time of the merger
in an industry having a postmerger four-firm concentration ra-
tio of 24.4 percent.64
Accepting the view that there is a significant correlation 65
between concentration in an industry and the degree of market
power exercised therein, the Justice Department issued guide-
lines in 1968 that mirrored the approach of the Warren Court.
Justice Stewart's famous observation, that "[tihe sole consis-
tency... is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always
wins,"66 illustrated the significance of the Guidelines to busi-
59. Concentration refers to the percentage of total industry sales or assets
contributed by the few largest firms. The 1968 Guidelines applied a four-firm
concentration ratio, indicating the percentage of market output produced by
the four largest firms of a particular industry. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at
56-57. See also Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice, 2 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 4510 [hereinafter cited as 1968 Guidelines].
60. 374 U.S. at 363.
61. Id. at 364-65.
62. In the three years following the Philadelphia National Bank decision,
the Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to accept much lower concen-
tration ratios and market shares as proof of an illegal merger. In United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, t l8 (1964), the Court voided a merger
between firms with 27.8% and 1.3% market shares in a market with a four-firm
concentration ratio of 76%. Then the Supreme Court moved further below the
30% postmerger market share of Philadelphia National Bank, disallowing a
merger in an industry where six firms produced 70.1% of output and the merg-
ing firms produced 21.9% and 3.1%. See United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964). Finally, in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S.
546, 551-52 (1966), the Court reversed a dismissal of the complaint by the dis-
trict court and suggested that, in an industry with a 10-firm concentration ratio
of 52.6%, a merger which resulted in a new firm with a 4.5% market share vio-
lated the Clayton Act.
63. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
64. Id. at 281 (White, J., concurring).
65. Correlation is a statistical concept referring to the amount of change in
one variable (profits in this case) which can be associated with a change in the
second variable (concentration). See D. FREEDMAN, R PISANI, & R. PuavEs,
STATIsTIcs 112-20, 136-37 (1978).
66. United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). The Justice Department won 37 of the 40 antitrust cases it tried
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ness in predicting whether the Justice Department would chal-
lenge a proposed merger. The 1968 Guidelines differentiated
markets by whether they were highly concentrated-four-firm
concentration ratios of 75 percent or more-or less concen-
trated-four-firm concentration ratios of less than 75 percent.67
Within each category, the Guidelines established market share
ceilings for parties to a merger, yielding accurate predictions
regarding the likelihood that the Justice Department would
challenge the proposed merger.68
Reliance on concentration as a measure of the probable
performance of an industry also reflected contemporaneous le-
gal and economic thinking.69 In his pioneer study in 1951, Joe S.
Bain found a correlation between the concentration ratio and
the profit levels of large firms in an industry, a result verified in
several later studies.7 0 In fact, prior to 1968, only one major
study had questioned the relationship between the four-firm
concentration ratio and profits.7 1 After 1968, however, criticism
before the Supreme Court between 1953 and 1965. Arnold, The Supreme Court
and the Antitrust Laws 1953-1967, 34 ArIrrRUST LJ. 2, 3-4 (1967).
67. See 1968 Guidelines, supra note 59.
68. In "highly concentrated" industries, the Justice Department would or-
dinarily challenge mergers where the firms had the following market shares:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% 1% or more
In "less highly concentrated" industries, the Justice Department would chal-
lenge mergers where the firms held the following market shares:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Finn
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% 1% or more
In both categories, the Department would interpolate percentages not shown in
the table. 1968 Guidelines, supra note 59, 4510 at 6884. The Department would
also challenge a merger regardless of the market share analysis if the market
showed a trend toward concentration or the acquired firm had been unusually
competitive or "disruptive." Id.
69. See P. Pautler, A Review of the Economic Basis for Broad-Based Hori-
zontal Merger Policy 18-27 (October 1981) (Federal Trade Commission Working
Draft).
70. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American
Manufacturing, 1936-40, 65 Q. J. ECON. 293, 311-21 (1951). See generally Weiss,
The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust in INDUSTRIAL CONCEN-
TRATION: THE NEw LEARNING 184-233 (1974) (discussion of studies on the rela-
tionship between concentration and profits).
71. P. Pautler, supra note 69, at 23. See Comanor & Wilson, Advertising,
Market Structure, and Performance, 49 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 423, 423 (1967)
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of the Guidelines and the relationship between the four-firm
concentration ratio and performance increased. In a 1971 arti-
cle critical of Bain's findings, Professor Yale Brozen challenged
the existence of any market power relationship between con-
centration and profits, and instead attributed supracompetitive
profits in concentrated industries to market disequilibrium and
economies of scale.72 Richard A. Posner and George J. Stigler
agreed with Bain that there was some correlation between con-
centration and market power, but would have substituted the
Herfindahl index as a more appropriate indicator.73 Nearly all
critics, including Posner and Stigler, stressed, however, that
concentration ratios and market shares, by themselves, do not
accurately reflect the effect of concentration on performance.74
In response to academic criticism, or perhaps as a result of
a change in the composition of the Court, the Burger Court
markedly altered the evidentiary standard for proving a
merger's effect on performance. In United States v. General Dy-
namics Corp., 75 the Court moved the emphasis away from sim-
ple structural analysis of mere concentration and market share
data and indicated that it would consider other structural vari-
ables including the history and probable future of competition
in the industry.76 Market share evidence may still establish a
prima facie case against a merger, but other economic factors
are now clearly relevant in assessing the effects of a merger.77
The shift in approach by the Court, combined with changes in
(four-firm concentration ratio, in itself, is not a good indicator of market
power).
72. Market disequilibrium refers to the short-run phenomenon when eco-
nomic profits may exist in a perfectly competitive market until new firms enter
or current producers expand their plant capacity. Economies of scale is the
concept that large firms may produce a good more efficiently than smaller
firms. Thus, in a market with large and small firms, small firms may just break
even while the large firms enjoy profits. See Brozen, Bain's Concentration and
Rates of Return Revisited, 14 J. L. & ECON. 351, 351-52, 362-66 (1971). See also
Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J. L. &
ECON. 1, 1, 8-9 (1973) (suggesting that concentration reflects the cost superiority
of large-scale firms).
73. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1602 (1969); Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust
Laws, in THE ORGANZATION OF INDUSTRY 261-62 (1968).
74. See Posner, supra note 73, at 1603; G. STIGLER, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCTIVIT AND COMPETrION, reprinted in 2 ANTrRUST L. & ECON.
Rxv. 13, 25-27 (Spring 1969).
75. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
76. Id. at 498.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 631
(1974).
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economic thinking and Justice Department philosophy, 78
brought the 1968 Guidelines into disrepute.
III. THE 1982 GUIDELINES FOR HORIZONTAL MERGERS
A. THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE 1982 GUIDELINES
The 1982 Guidelines respond to the criticism leveled
against the 1968 Guidelines by adopting a broad-based ap-
proach to market power analysis that involves examining a
number of structural, behavioral, and performance factors tend-
ing to make collusion among firms easier. But the revised
Guidelines do not wholly abandon the simplified structural
analysis of their predecessor, for in some cases concentration
and market share data alone still determine the Justice Depart-
ment's likely response to a proposed merger.7 9
1. An Overview of the 1982 Guidelines
In assessing a merger, the Guidelines indicate that the De-
partment will first attempt to construct the relevant product
and geographic market in which to evaluate the merger's ef-
fects by using the economic concept of cross-elasticity of de-
mand.80 The object is to find that group of products and
geographic area in which a hypothetical monopolist could raise
prices profitably-in other words, a product and geographic
market which includes all products with a significant cross-
elasticity of demand to the merging firms' product.8 1
The Department will evaluate the merger within this hypo-
thetical market by computing the postmerger market concen-
tration and the increase in concentration resulting from the
merger, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).82 The
Guidelines group markets into three categories according to
their HHIs. Markets having an HHI below 1,000 are character-
ized as "unconcentrated," those having an HHI between 1,000
78. Even before the release of the 1982 Guidelines, Attorney General Wil-
liam French Smith and Antitrust Division Chief William Baxter had stated that
the 1968 Guidelines no longer reflected the Justice Department's enforcement
intentions. See Remarks of Attorney General William French Smith to 30th An-
nual Spring Meeting of ABA's Section of Antitrust Law, [Jan-June] ANTUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1059, at 759 (April 8, 1982); Justice Department's
New Merger Guidelines May Be Ready by Winter, Baxter Indicates, [July-Dec.]
ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1027, at A-4 (August 13, 1981).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85, 87.
80. See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4502.10.
81. Id. See also infra note 165, 172.
82. For an explanation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, see infra note
96. See also notes 93-125 and accompanying text.
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and 1,800 are described as "moderately concentrated," and
those having an HHI above 1,800 are considered "highly
concentrated."83
The Depaftment is not likely to challenge any merger in an
unconcentrated market.84 It is also unlikely to challenge any
merger in a moderately concentrated market if the increase in
HHI caused by the merger is less than 100 points.85 If the in-
crease exceeds 100 points, the Department will consider other
factors 86 in determining whether to contest the merger. The
Department will challenge mergers in highly concentrated mar-
kets if the increase in HHI exceeds 100 points, but will not chal-
lenge mergers where the increase is less than 50 points.87
83. See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4503.10.
84. Id. 4503.101.
85. Id. 1 4503.101. The merger of two firms in an industry increases the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by twice the product of their market shares. See
infra note 96. Therefore, in a moderately concentrated industry, the Depart-
ment will allow mergers between firms with the following market shares:
Acquiring Acquired
5% 10%
10% 5%
15% 3.3%
20% 2.5%
25% 2%
The headings "acquiring" and "acquired" merely facilitate comparison with the
1968 Guidelines. See supra note 68. Because the market share criteria are
given in terms of increases in the HHI, the acquisition of a large firm by a firm
with a small market share would also violate the Guidelines if twice the prod-
uct of their market shares exceeded 100.
86. For a discussion of the Guidelines' other factors, see infra notes 126-49
and accompanying text.
87. See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4503.101. Thus, in a highly concentrated
industry, the Justice Department is likely to allow mergers between firms with
the following market shares:
Acquiring Acquired
4% 6.2%
10% 2.5%
15% 1.7%
25% 1%
At the other extreme, the Justice Department would probably challenge any
merger where the merging firms had market shares of at least the following.
Acquiring Acquired
4% 12.5%
10% 5%
15% 3.3%
25% 2%
The allowable mergers are determined by the firms' market shares, not by any
distinction as to which firm is "acquiring" and which is "acquired." Those
headings merely facilitate comparison with the 1968 Guidelines. See supra note
68.
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Where the increase is between 50 and 100 points in a highly
concentrated market, other factors will determine the Depart-
ment's response.88 In addition to the above categories in which
a challenge is likely, the Department is also likely to contest
any merger involving a firm with a market share of at least 35
percent seeking to merge with a firm having a market share of
at least 1 percent.89
The Guidelines indicate that the HIM thresholds of 1,000
and 1,800 correspond to four-firm concentration ratios of about
50 percent and 70 percent respectively, so that the highly con-
centrated market is roughly comparable to that of the 1968
Guidelines.9 0 On the other hand, the BHI increases allowed by
the new Guidelines are substantially more lenient than those
that would have been permitted under the former Guidelines.9 '
The liberalization of the standards, however, is in keeping with
the theme of the new Guidelines-avoiding interference with
beneficial and neutral mergers, while challenging only those
that are competitively harmful.92
2. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The most dramatic change effected by the 1982 Guidelines
is the substitution of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the
four-firm concentration ratio as the principal measure of mar-
ket power.93 This change improves merger analysis for several
reasons. The four-firm concentration ratio, technically referred
to as a "discrete" measure of concentration, reflects only the
shares of the top four firms and gives no consideration to their
relative sizes. 94 The 1HI, on the other hand, serves as a "sum-
88. See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4503.101.
89. Id. T 4503.102.
90. Id. 14503.10. See supra text accompanying note 67. See also J. Zucker-
man, A Walk Through the Merger Guidelines 9 (June 18, 1982) (available from
United States Department of Justice). The 1000 threshold corresponds to an in-
dustry with ten equal size firms while the 1800 level falls between the
equivalent of an industry with five equal size firms and one with six such firms.
See infra note 99.
91. Compare supra notes 85 (merger in a moderately concentrated indus-
try under new Guidelines) and 87 (highly concentrated industry) with note 68
(merger in a highly concentrated industry under 1968 Guidelines).
92. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
93. Prior to the release of the 1982 Guidelines, most authors referred to
this index as the Herflndahl index. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 73, at 1602;
Stigler, supra note 73, at 261. The Justice Department has recognized Hirsch-
man's claim of discovering the index and gives him equal billing. For Hirsch-
man's history of the Herflndahl-Hirschman Index, see Hirschman, The
Paternity of an Index, 54 Am. EcoN. R.v. 761 (1964).
94. See D. NEEDHAM, supra note 15, at 124-25.
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mary" index95 that computes concentration as the sum of the
squares of the market share of each firm in the industry rather
than merely the sum of the market shares of the four largest
firms.9 6 Moreover, because the HHI squares the market shares,
it weighs larger firms, which probably have greater influence on
market behavior,97 more heavily than very small firms, which
have virtually no effect on market behavior.98 The HBI, as a
summary index, thus allows comparisons between industries
with the same four-firm concentration ratios based on the dis-
tribution of shares among the firms in each industry.99
In addition to being a summary index the HHI also func-
tions as a "relative" concentration measure, reflecting the de-
gree of inequality of firm size in an industry.O0 Everything else
95. See id. at 125. n
96. Mathematically, HHI = 1 (s,)2, where n is the number of firms in thei=1
industry and s i is the market share of the i th firm. See id. Although most
economists use the decimal value of the market shares so that the Herflndahl-
Hirschman Index ranges from 0 to 1, the Department chose to eliminate any
confusion with decimals and therefore uses market shares as whole numbers.
See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4503.10 n.29. With the Department's methodol-
ogy, the HI-H could range from 0 to 10,000. For example, a market containing
five equal size firms has an HHI of (20)2 + (20)2 + (20)2 + (20)2 + (20)2 = 2000.
If the market contains eleven firms with market shares of 35, 25, 15, 10, 5, 2, 2, 2,
2, 1, and 1, the HI is (35)2 + (25)2 + (15)2 + (10)2 + (5)2 + (2)2 + (2)2 + (2)2 +
(2)2 + (1)2 + (1)2 = 2218.
Because the HI weighs the market share of each firm, it reflects the
change in concentration caused by the merger. For a merger of two firms in an
industry, the HHI increases by twice the product of their market shares. For
example, if firm A has a market share of a% and firm B has a share of b%,
before the merger the Hi includes these two firms as a2 + b2. If the firms
merge, they form a new firm with a market share of (a + b)2 = a2 + b2 +2ab.
Since the premerger HI includes a 2 + b2, the increase in the HHI is 2ab.
97. Assuming some barriers to entry exist, firms with large market shares
tend to have some degree of market power, which enables them to influence
price. See P. WONNACOTr & IL WNNAcOTr, supra note 25, at 480.
98. Twenty firms with a 1% market share add twenty points (20 X (1)2) to
the HHI value; however, one firm with a 20% market share adds four hundred
points (20)2.
99. See Adelman, Comment on the "H" Concentration Measure as a Num-
bers Equivalen; 51 REV. ECON. STATIsTIcs 99, 100 (1969). Two industries, one
with firms with market shares of 40, 25, 10, 5, 5, 5, 5, and 5 and the other with
firms of market sizes 20, 20, 20, 20, 5, 5, 5, and 5, both have four-firm concentra-
tion ratios of 80%. The first, however, has an HI of 2450 while the second has
an HHI of 1700.
The inverse of the decimal HIl can also be interpreted as the equivalent
number of equal size firms. Thus the Justice Department threshold of 1000 is
equivalent to an industry with - = 10 equal size firms; the 1800 point mark1.1000
relates to . = 5.56 equal size firms.
100. See D. NEEDHAM, supra note 15, at 126-27.
[Vol. 67:749
MERGER GUIDELINES
being equal, industries consisting of relatively equal-sized firms
will behave more competitively than those consisting of dispro-
portionately sized firms. Because the HI is the algebraic
equivalent of a formula that includes the standard deviation of
firm sizes (a measure of size inequality),Ol a formula that
yields larger results the greater the size disparity of firms, the
value of the HI increases as firm disparity increases.10 2 For
industries with the same number of firms, those with greater
market share inequality will have higher Hi values. Conse-
quently, if performance is more dependent on the relative size
of firms than on the market share held by the four largest firms,
the EHI will more accurately reflect the degree of market
power in that industry than will the four-firm concentration
ratio.
Whether a discrete, summary, or relative concentration
measure is best, however, depends on which aspect of struc-
ture actually has the greatest effect on performance, or, more
succinctly, which oligopoly theory is correct. Although econom-
ics has no generally accepted oligopoly theory, 0 3 the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index-unlike the four-firm concentra-
tion ratio--can be justified under several well-known oligopoly
theories.
First, the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium assumptions can be
used to establish that the HE is related to the Lerner index of
n
101. The Herflindahl-Hirschman Index formula .1 (S,)2 can be rearranged
C2 + IZ
as H nI - j-, where C is the coefficient of variation of firm sizes and n re-
flects the number of firms in the industry. See id. at 127. Since the coefficient
of variation equals the standard deviation of firm sizes (a measure of size ine-
quality) divided by the mean (average) firm size, the C2 portion of the formula
causes the value of the HI to increase when the market shares of firms are
not equal. Id.
102. The standard deviation of firm sizes is calculated as s.d. =j(/,_.9)2
ket 1 , where s i is the market share of the i 'th firm, $ is the mean mar-
ket share, and n is the number of firms in the industry. See J. NETER, W. WAS-
SERMAN, & G. WHITMORE, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS FOR BusnEss AND
EcoNoMIcs 72 "(abr. 4th ed. 1973). When all firms in the industry are the same
size, si =.9 and the standard deviation equals zero. With such a market struc-
1ture, the H=I equals -, the lowest value for an industry with a given number of
firms. See supra note 101. Firm size disparity increases the standard deviation
and, consequently, the HHI value for the industry. For example, if one indus-
try has five firms, each with market share of 20%, while another industry has
firms with market shares of 40%, 30%, 20%, 5% and 5%, the HEI value for the
1first industry is -ff= 1/5 = .20, while the other firm has an HflI of (.40)2 + (.30)2
+ (.20)2 + (.05)2 + (.05)2 = .295.
103. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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market power.'0 4 Cournot's oligopoly model assumes that each
firm in the industry has the same capacity and cost functions,
takes the other firms' output as fixed regardless of its own out-
put decisions, and does riot coordinate its actions with any
other firm.l05 To this must be added the Nash Equilibrium as-
sumption-that no firm can improve its current profits by in-
dependent action, or expressed differently, that only
cooperation between firms will improve their profits.106 Under
these restrictive assumptions, the value of the Lerner index for
the industry will equal the BHI divided by the industry elastic-
ity of demand.107 Taking this analysis one step further, one can
measure the increase in the Lerner index caused by a merger
as the increase in the l divided by the elasticity of de-
mand.108 Therefore, if industry structure and conduct resemble
the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium assumptions, the increase in the
HHI caused by a merger will yield accurate estimates regarding
the market power effect of the merger. To the extent that tacit
or overt collusion does exist, however, firms presumably will
charge higher prices and thereby achieve market power ex-
ceeding the Lerner index value in a Cournot-Nash Equilib-
rium.109 Thus, the Lerner index measure of performance
derived from the BHI reflects the lower limit of market power
present in the industry."10
104. See Hause, The Measurement of Concentrated Industrial Structure and
Size Distribution, 6 ANNALs ECON. SOC. MEASUREMENT 73, 79-80 (1977).
105. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 331-33. To take the competitors'
output as given means that firm A assumes that all other firms will continue to
produce the same output regardless of the amount firm A produces. Id. at 331-
32. Where these assumptions are true, the firms in the industry will wind up
dividing the industry output evenly. Id. at 331-33.
106. See Hause, supra note 104, at 81.
107. Under the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium assumptions the Lerner index of
P -MCj s iwees stemre hr
market power for any firm is Lli = - - ,where siis the market share
of the firm and Ed is the elasticity of demand for the industry. To obtain a
value of the Lerner index for the industry, each firm's Lerner index value is
weighted by the market share of the firm. Thus L, the value of the Lerner in-
dex for the industry, is LI = Zs LI i = - --- Since JSi
2 
- HI, the industry
i~l Ed
-- HHI
Lerner index, L! equals -- H-. See Hause, supra note 104, at 79-81.
108. See Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Herfindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and
Mergers, 95 HARv. L. Rlv. 1857, 1867-68 (1982).
109. See Hause, supra note 104, at 81. But see Landes & Posner, supra note
4, at 952 (asserting that the Lerner index provides an upper limit on the
amount of market power when marginal cost is increasing).
110. See Hause, supra note 104, at 81.
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The HHI may also provide a theoretically justifiable meas-
ure of market power in an industry containing a few large firms
and a competitive fringe."' Under this structure, presuming
conduct where the large firms split their combined market
shares noncooperatively,"n2 the Lerner index for the large firms
is a function of the HIH and two other structural variables: the
market elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply for the
competitive fringe." 3 Again, the increase in the HI caused by
a merger would be proportional, under these assumptions, to
the increase in the Lerner index." 4 Thus, in this model, the
HI measure of concentration relates the change in structure
from a merger to the resulting effect on market performance.
Because collusion would enable the large firms to exercise mar-
ket power greater than that indicated by the Lerner index
value derived from the HI, this performance estimate would
111. This structure reflects a derivation of the dominant firm theory. In the
dominant firm theory, one very large firm produces the bulk of industry output
with the remainder coming from a "competitive fringe," a number of small
firms with limited production capacity. Under this structure, the demand curve
facing the dominant firm consists of the market demand at each price less the
quantity supplied by the fringe firms at that price. The dominant firm then acts
like a monopolist over this residual demand. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at
232. Recent literature on market power has assumed a structure of a dominant
firm or a number of large firms sharing a dominant share in order to analyze
market power or to demonstrate the relationship between market power and
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. See, e.g., Hause, supra note 104, at 86-87;
Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 944; Ordover, Sykes & Willig, supra note 108,
at 1859-66.
112. That is, the large firms will split the portion of the market not produced
by the competitive fringe along a Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. See .supra notes
104-08 and accompanying text. HHI
113. The Lerner index for the industry is Ed - (1 - k)& where Ed is the
market elasticity of demand, k is the portion of industry output produced by
nonfringe firms, and & is the elasticity of supply for the competitive fringe. See
Hause, supra note 104, at 86. Ordover, Sykes, and Willig take this analysis one
step further by entering a variable for "conjectural variation" which allows
them to loosen the noncooperation assumption of Coumot-Nash equilibrium
conduct. See Ordover, Sykes & Willig, supra note 108, at 1860.
114. If HHIb represents the concentration level before the merger and HHIp
is the postmerger HI, then the premerger level of market power is
HHIb
Lib = Ed - (1 - k) ' and the postmerger level of market power is
HHI PL1P- Ed - (1 - A:)&*
As long as no other variables change, the increase in the Lerner index for the
industry is
HHD1 - HHbLlp -LIb -Ed (1-_k)&
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also yield a lower bound on the market power present in the
industry.11 5
Finally, Stigler's theory of oligopoly maintains that there is
a relationship between structure, as measured by the HHI, and
the likelihood of collusion in a market." 6 Because any member
of a cartel can increase profits if it can reduce its price while
the other firms maintain their prices, each oligopolist has an in-
centive to cheat on a collusive agreement." 7 This incentive is
tempered by the knowledge that detection of the cheating will
cause the other firms to reduce price and, consequently, leave
all firms worse off than if they had kept the collusive agree-
ment.1 1 8 Thus, a firm will find cheating profitable only if the
other colluders do not detect the cheating." 9 Starting with this
cartel theory, Stigler hypothesized that industries with many
small firms are less likely to sustain a collusive agreement
without cheating than more concentrated industries with only a
few firms. Stigler maintained that this likelihood could be ex-
pressed as a function of the Herfndahl-Hirschman Index of
concentration-the higher the HHI, according to Stigler's the-
ory, the greater the probability of successful collusion.120 Stig-
ler concluded that the HIl is an appropriate measure of
concentration so long as the probability of successful collusion
remains a concern of merger policy.12 '
Economists, in general, favor the Herflndahl-Hirschman In-
dex not only because it has some theoretical justification but
also because it has shown a somewhat better correlation with
profits than the four-firm concentration ratio.122 An empirical
study of the effects of bank concentration found that the B11
measure of concentration predicted whether banks obtained
more favorable loan terms and interest rates.123 In a study of
115. See Hause, supra note 104, at 86-87.
116. See Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
41-45 (1968).
117. See E. MANSFI.D, supra note 17, at 344; Stigler, supra note 116, at 42.
118. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 346.
119. Id.
120. Stigler, supra note 116, at 55.
121. Stigler, supra note 73, at 262.
122. See Stigler, supra note 116, at 59; see also Weiss, supra note 70, at 204-
220 (listing 46 studies testing concentration-profits relationship). But see J.
KOwxA, FEDERAL TRADE CoMMdIssION STAFF REPORT ON MARKET SHARES, CON-
CENTRATION, AND COMPETITION IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 21-24 (1978) (find-
ing slightly better correlations for the Herflndahl-Hirschman Index but warning
that the HHI does not perform much better than the conventional concentra-
tion ratios).
123. Hester, Customer Relationships and Term of Loans: Evidence from a
Pilot Survey, 11 J. MONEY, CREDrr & BANKING 349, 357 (1979).
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retail gasoline markets, the correlation between the BHI and
price supported Stigler's theory that industries with low HHI
values would succumb to the temptation of cheating on collu-
sive agreements before those with high HUT concentration
measures. 24 This latter study also found a stronger correlation
between the HIlT and price when firms competed than when
they colluded, a result that the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
would predict.125
3. Other Factors
Where postmerger HUI and market share data are incon-
clusive, the Justice Department will examine a number of other
factors before deciding whether to challenge the merger. 26
Ease of entry is the first such factor. The exercise of market
power requires some barrier to entry,127 such as economies of
scale, legal rights (patents or licenses), control of inputs, or
product differentiation.128 Rather than estimating these barri-
ers directly, the Department will attempt to predict the extent
of new entry that would result--either through production sub-
stitution or construction of new facilities-by a hypothetical
price hike of five percent on the relevant product.12 9 Produc-
tion substitution refers to the process of adapting existing facil-
ities to produce the "relevant product."' 30 If firms in a market
collude or exercise market power to raise prices, firms with
similar facilities that currently produce a different product have
an incentive to switch and produce the more profitable one.1 31
A relatively low level of economic profits132 will induce entry if
another firm can make such a shift in production at little
124. Marvel, Competition and Price Levels in the Retail Gasoline Marke4 60
REV. EcoN. STATITICS 252, 258 (1978).
125. Id. at 257. See supra text accompanying notes 104-10.
126. Guidelines, supra note 1, 4503.30; J. Zuckerman, supra note 90, at 11.
127. Barriers to entry include the cost of minimum efficient plant size, the
cost of heavy initial advertising to overcome the product differentiation current
producers have built up, and the costs of obtaining natural resources, inputs or
patent rights to the extent these costs are higher than those incurred by cur-
rent producers. See generally E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 351-53 (long-run
barriers to entry).
128. See P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 4, at 299.
129. Guidelines, supra note 1, 4503.20.
130. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 948. "Relevant product" includes
all goods which the court finds to be substitutes for the good produced by the
merging firms. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-28 (1962).
131. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 948.
132. Economic profits consist of the amount by which revenues exceed the
accounting costs of production plus a normal rate of return on investment. See
P. WONNACOTr & R. WONNACOTr, supra note 25, at 424-25.
1983]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cost.13 3 Entry may also occur by firms constructing new pro-
duction facilities. De novo entry will have a long-term effect on
performance, because the new entrant generally will stay in the
market until it depreciates the assets or switches them to a
more profitable use. To the extent that de novo entry requires
the commitment of expensive long-term assets, potential en-
trants will require higher, nontransitory profits before
entering.'3
The inclusion of "ease of entry" criteria represents a depar-
ture from past merger analysis. Although Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States135 cited barriers to entry as a factor affecting per-
formance, the Supreme Court generally has limited ease of en-
try analysis to cases involving potential competition.136
Similarly, the 1968 Guidelines gave no consideration to ease of
entry in horizontal merger analysis. 137 Since economic theory
asserts that profits cannot be maintained above competitive
levels for any significant period unless some barriers to entry
exist, inclusion of this factor in merger analysis represents an
improvement over the 1968 Guidelines.
In addition to ease of entry, the Department will also con-
sider other structural factors. One of these is the degree of
product homogeneity within the relevant market. 38 The more
differentiated the products within a market, the more difficulty
firms will have coordinating prices.139 If, for example, consum-
ers perceive quality differences between different firms' prod-
ucts, the firms in that market will have to agree on price
differentials for the firms' products in order to achieve a stable
133. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 60.
134. Businesses are unlikely to invest in expensive, specialized equipment
if they believe that economic profits present in an industry are only a short-run
phenomenon. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 351-53; P. WoNNAcorr & R.
WONNACOTr, supra note 25, at 492.
135. 370 U.S. 294, 322 (1962). A number of lower court decisions, however,
have cited ease of entry as an important factor in horizontal merger analysis.
See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1981), cer,
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315,
326 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982
(1982); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84,
90, 94 (N.D. Il. 1981); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061,
1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
136. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor and Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568, 579 (1967).
137. See 1968 Guidelines, supra note 59, 1 4510.
138. Guidelines, supra note 1, 1 4503.301(a).
139. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 919, at 91; F. SCHERER,
supra note 15, at 200-03.
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market equilibrium at an overall higher price level.140 Price
agreement will be more difficult to achieve as product differen-
tiation increases, since significant product heterogeneity proba-
bly indicates that each firm is confronting different demand
and marginal revenue curves and therefore will prefer to price
at a different level from its rivals.141 Conversely, product homo-
geneity facilitates price agreement among rivals, since the de-
mand and marginal revenue functions of each firm are more
likely to be similar.
A second structural factor considered by the Guidelines is
the cross-elasticity of demand between the product market and
the next-best substitute.142 The lower the cross-elasticity of de-
mand at the edge of the product market, the more market
power will be present in that market. Thus, a significant gap in
consumer perception between the last product included in the
relevant product market and the next-best substitute increases
confidence in the market definition,43 and in the HHI value for
that market as well, giving the Department a stronger basis for
challenging the merger.
Another factor entering into the Department's calculus is
the ease with which colluding firms in the market can detect
cheating.144 The existence of detailed price information or a
system that publishes bids and specifications can reveal cheat-
ing and thus make a collusive agreement easier to police.145
Colluding firms can also detect cheating easily if the market
contains many small buyers. 4 6 Although a firm needs to at-
tract a number of small buyers to make cheating profitable,
each additional communication of the lower price increases the
probability that the other cartel members will discover the
cheating.147
140. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 200-03; Stigler, supra note 116, at 41.
141. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 158.
142. See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4503.301(b).
143. An accurately defined market takes on increased importance in merger
analysis using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. See infra notes 165-67 and ac-
companying text.
144. Guidelines, supra note 1, T 4503.302.
145. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 710 (1948)
(publication of basing point prices and freight rates enabled cement dealers to
submit identical bids); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377, 398-99 (1921) (exchange of detailed reports including shipping reports
and price information "makes the discovery of price reductions inevitable and
immediate"). See also Stigler, supra note 116, at 44-45 (policing of price
agreements).
146. See Stigler, supra note 116, at 43-44.
147. Id.
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Finally, the Department will consider nonstructural factors,
such as past industry conduct and market performance. 48 Evi-
dence of past collusion or pricing policies and market perform-
ance tending to indicate collusive conduct increases the
probability that collusion will occur under the more concen-
trated postmerger structure.149
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE EcoNoMIc APPROACH OF THE 1982
GuiDEINEs
The 1982 Guidelines create a number of problems for the
business community, for courts, and for antitrust practitioners.
While the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index cures some of the defi-
ciencies of the four-firm concentration ratio, it is not necessar-
ily a better predictor of oligopoly performance. In addition, the
ease of entry criterion cannot be easily calculated, and the
other factors the Department will consider when HI is incon-
clusive are not weighted, so their relative importance cannot be
assessed. In sum, the Guidelines tend to complicate the pro-
cess of predicting a Departmental challenge, thereby failing to
fulfill the general purpose of merger guidelines.
1. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, although admittedly an
improvement insofar as it can measure the change in concen-
tration resulting from any merger, 5 0 gives the impression of
expressing more than it actually does. Although the HHI fol-
lows from some restrictive theories of oligopoly,151 it may not
reflect the actual relationship between structure and perform-
ance in some industries. 5 2 The correct choice of a concentra-
148. See Guidelines, supra note 1, 1 4503.303-.304.
149. The propensity of'firms in an industry to cooperate and fix prices has
an effect on the market power present in the industry. Oligopolists behaving
under the assumptions of the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium have less market
power than if they collude and act like a monopolist. See Ordover, Sykes & Wil-
lig, supra note 108, at 1860-63 (analysis of how the propensity to cooperate may
affect the Lerner index value for the industry). Evidence of past collusion or
competition can allow the Department to assess the tendency of firms to col-
lude and thus indicate whether the Lerner index derived from the HHI under-
estimates or overestimates the market power present in the industry.
150. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
152. Professor F.M. Scherer, a former director of the Federal Trade
Commission's (FTC) Bureau of Economics, was 'Just a little bit amused" by
the choice of the Hi rather than the four-firm concentration ratio. He com-
pared the choice to picking a sharp scalpel for surgery on something no one un-
derstands. Antitrust Practitioners React Favorably to New Merger Guidelines,
[Jan.-June] ANTrR UsT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1070, at 1315, 1316-17
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tion measure depends not so much on the oligopoly structure
as on the type of conduct assumed.153 One commentator de-
scribed the shortcoming of concentration measures as follows:
[W]hat is important [in choosing a concentration measure] is the
weight accorded to the number and size distribution of rival firms by
decisionmakers in an industry in their decisionmaking .... [T]he dif-
ference between alternative concentration indexes lies in the weights
which they assign to the market shares of firms in an industry. Accord-
ingly, it follows that arguments for a particular concentration measure
reflect little more than the proponent's belief that the weighting system
inherent in that index reflects the weighting system which is operative
in the minds of decisionmakers in industry in practice.1 54
Inherent in the weighting scheme of the HI is the assumption
that firms take all their rivals into account in decisionmaking
and give weight to each rival in proportion to its market
share. 55 If, instead, the conduct of an industry flows from the
dominant influence of a few large firms, or solely from the dis-
parity in firm size, the HI-I will yield a distorted picture of
likely performance in that industry.156 Empirical studies differ
as to which index best captures the significance of concentra-
tion within an industry, with some work indicating that meas-
ures other than the HI may yield better predictions of the
level of market power in an industry.157 Thus, the Herfindahl-
(June 24, 1982). Professor Kwoka notes that the HI can be rearranged as
HHI - + 1 (s, - &)2 where n is the number of firms in the industry, s i
represents the market share of the ith firm, and s is the mean market share.
Viewed in this manner, the n term forms the minimum value of the HI and
reflects the inverse of the number of firms in the industry. See supra notes 101-
02. The second term is the formula for the statistical variance of firm market
shares, describing the size inequality. Kwoka asserts that both these factors
may aid in predicting performance but that the combination of them in the HI
is arbitrary and that better predictions of performance may result if they are
related to performance separately. See Kwoka, Large Firm Dominance and
Price-Cost Margins in Manufacturing Industries, 44 S. ECON. J. 183, 183-84
(1977).
153. See Dansby & Willig, Industry Performance Gradient Indexes, 69 Am.
ECON. Rnv. 249, 249, 255-57 (1979).
154. D. NEEDHAM, supra note 15, at 128 (emphasis in original).
155. See id.
156. See Encaoua & Jacquemin, Degree of Monopoly, Indexes of Concentra-
tion and Threat of Entry, 21 INT'L ECON. REV. 87, 95, 99-103 (1980) (providing a
theoretical justification for the k-firm concentration ratio-where k is some
number of the largest firms in the industry-in a Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, a
price leadership oligopoly, and a dynamic model where entry depends on the
price and non-price policies of the dominant firms); Kwoka, supra note 152, at
188 (suggesting that industries dominated by a few large firms are more likely
to be anticompetitive than highly concentrated ones with less firm size
disparity).
157. See, e.g., Kwoka, Does the Choice of Concentration Measure Really Mat-
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Hirschman Index, although an improvement over the four-firm
concentration ratio, is not an unassailable choice as a concen-
tration measure.
Another integral, yet theoretically and empirically unjusti-
fied, feature of the 1982 Guidelines is the HHI classification of
markets into highly concentrated, moderately concentrated,
and unconcentrated markets. No studies confirm, for example,
that collusion is unlikely among 10 firms-the number of equal
size firms corresponding to an H1HI of 1000--but suddenly be-
comes a problem with six firns-the number most nearly cor-
responding to an HHI of 1,800. Moreover, the HHI increases
permitted by the Guidelines within each level of concentration
are equally unsubstantiated by any data. Instead, .these classi-
fications are based on the Department's belief that horizontal
mergers can benefit the economy by increasing efficiency and
thus the Justice Department should not unduly interfere with
them.ls 8 This view, however, is subject to considerable debate.
Although some economists claim that concentration reflects the
most efficient means of production,159 studies of specific merg-
ers do not substantiate the claimed resource savings or efficien-
cies. 160 Increases in the HHI may reflect an increase in the
level of market power in that industry,161 yet the level of the
HI at which the amount of market power in that industry is
intolerable cannot be known with exactitude.162 The liberaliza-
ter?, 29 J. INDus. ECON. 445, 450-52 (1981) (favoring the two-firm concentration
ratio); Kwoka, supra note 152, at 184-89 (favoring a measure of firm domi-
nance); Miller, Numbers Equivalents, Relative Entropy, and Concentration Ra-
tios: A Comparison Using Market Performance, 39 S. ECON. J. 107, 110-11 (1972)
(finding the relative entropy measure the best predictor of industry
performance).
158. According to the Justice Department, mergers "can penalize ineffective
management and facilitate the efficient flow of investment capital and the rede-
ployment of existing productive assets. While challenging competitively harm-
ful mergers, the Department seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with that
larger universe of mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral."
Guidelines, supra note 1, 14502. See also J. Zukerman, supra note 90, at 3.
159. See, e.g., Brozen, supra note 72, at 362-66.
160. See Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcemen
to be published in 92 YALE L. J., at Section I (1982); Meehan, Rules vs. Discre-
tion: A Reevaluation of the Merger Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 23 AN-
TRUST BULL. 769, 790-92 (1978). See also Scherer, Structure-Performance
Relationships and Antitrust Policy, 46 ANrusT L.J. 864, 871 (1977) ('"The pre-
ponderance of the evidence supports a conclusion that mergers have neither
improved nor reduced efficiency significantly relative to the merging firms' pre-
merger performance or the accomplishments of non-merging enterprises in
similar industries.").
161. See supra text accompanying notes 108 and 114.
162. The 1800 level of the H1I, for example, appears to be simply a compro-
mise between 1600 and 2000, two levels previously mentioned by the Justice De-
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tion of the market share criteria on the other hand, may reflect
a recognition of the difficulties in predicting any efficiencies
that may result from a merger.163 If the market share and con-
centration level factors of the new Guidelines stem from a de-
partmental decision to allow more mergers in order to ensure
the most efficiencies, 6 4 the liberalized standards reflect a philo-
sophical choice rather than one rooted in empirical evidence
from past mergers.
A further problem with the Guidelines is that any error in
defining the relevant market will blur any correlation between
the HHI and actual market power. If the Guidelines' market
definition expands the relevant market beyond its true size,
165
partment as the dividing line for highly concentrated industries. See Justice
Department Unveils Long-Awaited Revisions to Merger Guidelines; FTC Issues
Statement on Mergers, [Jan.-June] ANTIUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
1069, at 1251, 1253 (June 17, 1982).
163. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 160, at Section IlI.
164. Alan Fisher, an FTC economist, and Robert Lande, an FTC attorney,
suggest raising the market share guidelines in order to attain the greatest
number of efficiencies from mergers. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 160, at
Section V. See also FTC Statement on Horizontal Mergers, [Jan.-June] ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, at S-14 (June 17, 1982). The Guide-
lines reflect an attempt to allow all beneficial and neutral mergers, thus
opposing only those the Department believes to be anticompetitive. See Guide-
lines, supra note 1, 4501; J. Zuckerman, supra note 90, at 3. The Justice De-
partment, therefore, must value competitively neutral mergers, which by their
classification cannot be justified on the ground of improved efficiency, for the
purpose of penalizing ineffective management or facilitating the efficient flow of
investment capital. See Guidelines, supra note 1, T 4501.
165. Although this Note does not examine the product market definition of
the 1982 Guidelines in any detail, it should be noted that the Guidelines'
method of identifying the product market will result in larger markets than the
product market definition given by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). Under the new Guidelines, the Depart-
ment will first define a provisional market consisting of all goods which con-
sumers perceive as good substitutes for the merging firms' goods at prevailing
prices. The Department assumes that the price of all goods in this provisional
market rises by 5% and then determines if consumers, as a result of this price
hike, would shift their consumption to other goods. If such a shift would occur,
the Department will include the products consumers bought instead of those in
the provisional market as part of the product market. The Department will
continue expanding the market until a 5% price hike would not result in a "sig-
nificant percentage of the buyers of products already included" shifting and
buying other products. See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4502.10.
This hypothetical price hike analysis merely defines the market as includ-
ing all goods with a significant cross-elasticity of demand to the acquired firm's
product. This approach, however, ignores the clear message of Brown Shoe,
namely, that the cross-elasticity of demand between the product and its substi-
tutes determines only the outer boundaries of the product market. The Court
noted that "within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist
which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes." 370
U.S. at 325. By eliminating the submarket approach, the Justice Department
will identify only the larger "broad market," in which the merging firms will
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the HHI will compound the error. For example, assume that
the four largest firms in a correctly defined market each have a
market share of 22 percent with a number of very small firms
forming the remaining 12 percent.166 If the market estimated is
larger than the true market, so that each of the four largest
firms is calculated to hold only a 20 percent share of the mar-
ket, the four-firm concentration ratio would be 80 percent, a
deviation of only 10 percent from the true level of 88 percent.
Using the HHI, the estimated market has a value of 1600, com-
pared to the true value of 1936, a difference of 17 percent 67 and
a classification as moderately concentrated rather than highly
concentrated. Consequently, alternative market definitions will
have more dramatic effects on the HHI than on the four-firm
concentration ratio, so that more cases are likely to turn on the
market definition chosen. In the FTC challenge of the ConAgra
merger,168 for example, four different market definitions are
possible, yielding postmerger HHI values of 1845, 1794, 1140, or
828.169 Depending on the market definition chosen, the relevant
market could be classified as highly concentrated, moderately
concentrated, or unconcentrated. 170
2. Ease of Entry
If concentration and market share analysis does not indi-
cate whether the Department will challenge a merger,171 busi-
nesses must consider the Guidelines' tiebreaking factors, the
first of which is ease of entry. The Guidelines rely on a hypo-
thetical price hike method to analyze ease of entry,172 but they
control smaller market shares than they would of the submarket. Thus, the
market definition chosen by the Department further liberalizes merger rules.
166. The assumption of very small firms allows one to ignore the effects of
their market shares on the HI See supra note 98.
167. This assumes the small firms have no effect on the HIL If the remain-
ing firms each had 1% market shares, the Hi values would be 1620 and 1948
for the two market definitions.
168. FTC is Expected to Require ConAgra to Divest Flour Mills Acquired
From Peavey, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1074, at 229
(July 22, 1982).
169. Id. at 230.
170. See supra text accompanying note 83.
171. Some mergers will require only an analysis of the concentration and
market share guidelines to determine the response of the Justice Department
See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. The Department encoun-
tered some difficulty when it attempted to use a similar hypothetical price hike
method as a means of identifying the relevant geographic market in a bank
merger case. The court announced that it would be "utterly foolish to go off
chasing rainbows" with the Department and their hypothetical price hikes
when evidence is also offered "by the bankers in this case who are down at the
[Vol. 67:749
MERGER GUIDELINES
fail to indicate how the Department will determine the number
of firms that will enter in response to the price hike.173 Fur-
thermore, this hypothetical price hike method forces the analy-
sis one step beyond the essence of the ease of entry issue.
Current producers will expect a profitable exercise of market
power only when they believe that structural barriers make the
costs of entry prohibitive.174 Therefore, the Department need
determine, not necessarily how many firms would enter, but
whether any firm could enter in response to a price hike.175
This latter approach avoids the more complicated task of pre-
dicting the number of potential entrants at any price level and
instead focuses the analysis on the simpler task of estimating
the probable cost of entry.?6
The Guidelines' discussion of entry barriers also fails to
mention whether advertising or product differentiation should
be considered in ease of entry analysis. Firms enjoying a sig-
nificant degree of brand loyalty developed through prolonged
advertising can price persistently above their costs without at-
tracting new entry because newcomers, to overcome their infer-
ior image, must either price significantly below their more
established rivals or engage in extensive advertising to promote
their brand.177 In either case, the price or cost advantage en-
joyed by the established firms will discourage entry.178 In addi-
grass roots and know what's going on." See Virginia National Bank Gets Green
Light on Proposed Merger, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 1073, at 197 (July 15, 1982).
173. For determining the product market, where the Department uses a
similar hypothetical price hike, the Department will use historical evidence
when available or rely on questionnaire survey data in order to estimate the
effects of a price hike. See Antitrust Division's Chief Economist Defends Value
of New Merger Guidelines, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 1070, at 1303 (June 24, 1982). Presumably the Department would do the
same for ease of entry.
174. Without barriers to entry, new firms would enter the industry when-
ever economic profits appeared, thus eliminating any long-run economic profits.
See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 351-53.
175. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 982 (1982) (estimating the cost of building a refinery
at $1 billion and finding these costs constituted a "prohibitive" barrier to
entry).
176. Barriers to entry include the cost of minimum efficient plant size, the
cost of heavy initial advertising to overcome the product differentiation current
producers have built up, and the costs of obtaining natural resources, inputs or
patent rights to the extent that these costs are higher than those incurred by
current producers. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 352-53.
177. See F. SCHERER, supra note 41, at 341.
178. The courts, as well as commentators, have recognized the important ef-
fect of advertising as a barrier to entry. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967); United States v. Pabst Brewing
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tion, product differentiation, which is often the result of
successful advertising, may itself form an important barrier to
entry in markets for "experience goods," goods whose quality
cannot be determined until after a consumer purchases and
uses them. 7 9 Since a consumer must invest the purchase price
to determine the quality of the good, consumers will most
likely continue to purchase the first brand that performs satis-
factorily.180 New entrants to the market will find it difficult to
persuade customers satisfied with a current brand to abandon
it for the untried product of a newcomer.' 8 '
Finally, the 1982 Guidelines, even though they include an
ease of entry factor, undervalue the factor's importance to the
profitable exercise of market power. Even firms in a highly
concentrated market cannot maintain prices persistently above
costs unless some barrier prevents new entry.182 Only when
entry costs are prohibitively high will supracompetitive prices
not induce new competitors to enter the industry and force
prices down to competitive levels. If firms in the market per-
ceive that new firms will enter in response to relatively low eco-
nomic profits, a sufficient deterrent to the exercise of market
power exists to justify tolerating higher levels of concentra-
tion.183 Therefore, a more appropriate merger analysis would
consider barriers to entry-in terms of the absolute cost of an
efficient scale plant, higher costs for resources and production
methods, and advertising costs to overcome built-up product
differentiation' 8 4 -to be as important as the concentration and
market share criteria.
3. Other Factors
The remaining tiebreakers-such as the nature of the prod-
Co., 384 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Mann, Adver-
tising, Concentration, and Profitability: The State of Knowledge and Directions
for Public Policy, in INDuSTuzI CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 147 (1974)
(positive relationship between intense advertising, concentration, and
profitability).
179. Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering
Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 350 (1982).
180. Id. at 360.
181. Id.
182. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 351-53.
183. The barrier need not prevent all entry. As long as entry cannot occur
quickly, oligopolists may exercise market power to obtain monopoly profits in
the short-run, knowing that entry will occur and that their market power will
dissipate. See Stigler, The Dominant Firm and the Inverted Umbrella, in THE
ORGANIZATION OF INDusTRY 108-12 (1968).
184. See supra note 176.
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uct, the ease with which colluding firms can detect cheating,
and past industry performance--come within the "Other Fac-
tors" category of the Guidelines.185 The Department, however,
neglects to explain the relative weight it will give to each of
these factors. Presumably, these factors will affect the likeli-
hood of a challenge only if they suggest, on balance, either
competitiveness or ease of collusion. By including these
tiebreaking factors, the Department may have operated under
the mistaken assumption that more variables yield better
guidelines. More plausibly, the drafters included the
tiebreakers, which reflect nearly every conceivable factor econ-
omists believe affect cartel behavior, because of their uncer-
tainty about which oligopoly theory is correct.186 Instead of
facilitating prediction about the probable performance effects
of a merger or the likelihood of a Department challenge, the
tiebreakers merely increase the amount of information and the
number of calculations necessary to compare a given merger to
the Department's standards.187 Guidelines fail to fulfill their
purpose when they include any factor that increases the pre-
dictive power of the guidelines less than the additional costs of
increased complexity.188
Merger guidelines ideally should eliminate some of the am-
biguity in Supreme Court horizontal merger decisions.189 Al-
though the Department cannot tell businesses how the
Supreme Court would rule on a proposed merger, it can give al-
most equally valuable information by indicating whether the
Department is likely to challenge any given merger. Unfortu-
nately, businesses will have to obtain a mass of confusing eco-
185. See supra text accompanying notes 138-49.
186. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text
187. One practitioner referred to the 1982 Guidelines as "Te Economists'
Relief Act of 1982." Antitrust Practitioners React Favorably to New Merger
Guidelines, supra note 152, at 1317.
188. In economic terms, this directive can be restated as requiring informa-
tion only if the marginal cost of obtaining it does not exceed its marginal bene-
fit. See generally E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYsIS
134-58 (1978).
189. This arobiguity results primarily from the relatively small number of
Supreme Court decisions on horizontal mergers in the past twenty years and
the different treatment of concentration factors in the cases the Court did de-
cide. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 510-11 (statisti-
cal market share evidence of past production did not reflect probable effects of
merger's future effect on competition); United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S.
at 281 (merger forming firm with 8.9% market share violates section 7 even
though barriers to entry are low); United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,
374 U.S. at 364 (merger forming a firm with a 30% market share was presump-
tively illegal); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 322 (listing factors
to be considered under the "functional view" of mergers).
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nomic data to predict whether the Department will challenge a
particular merger under the new Guidelines. This does not im-
ply that the Guidelines themselves are confusing, but that the
application of the Guidelines can be confusing, especially if the
tiebreaking factors yield conflicting signals regarding the likely
performance effect of a merger. Businesses considering merg-
ers may understand the notion of market power and the theo-
retical reasons why the tiebreakers affect market power, yet
still have no idea how a potential merger stacks up against
these standards. The uncertainty will inevitably result in er-
rors in both directions-some businesses will merge on the in-
correct assumption that the Justice Department will not
challenge the merger while others will forgo mergers when no
challenge would have resulted.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR MORE APPROPRIATE
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
When the Justice Department replaced its 1968 Guidelines
with a new merger policy in 1982, the message given to busi-
ness was decidedly different from that of the previous dec-
ade. 19 0 The Department's new laissez-faire attitude toward
mergers stems from a belief that firms merge primarily as a
means of increasing efficiency, representing a shift from the
Department's strict antimerger attitude reflected in the 1968
Guidelines. As a policy choice, however, the wisdom of the cur-
rent "efficiencies" emphasis is questionable; it is unsupported
by empirical proof from actual mergers and may rely on inaccu-
rate assumptions regarding management behavior.
A. APPLICATION OF THE X-INEFFICIENCY FACTOR TO MERGER
ANALYSIS
Traditional merger analysis has been preoccupied with the
market power aspect of increased concentration. The evil that
conventional economic theory attributes to excessive market
power is the welfare loss resulting from the misallocation of re-
sources under the familiar monopoly model.191 But there is an-
other kind of loss associated with undue concentration which
also should be the concern of merger analysis. Economists call
this other kind of loss X-inefficiency-the difference between
the actual costs of production in an industry and the minimal
190. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. Cf. supra note 68 (treat-
ment of mergers under 1968 Guidelines).
191. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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costs that would exist if all firms in the industry were operating
under the constraints of perfect competition.192
The economic models used to predict industry performance
assume that, regardless of the level of concentration, all firms
will attempt to minimize their costs in order to maximize prof-
its.193 This assumption seems appropriate when applied to a
perfectly competitive market. In an industry with many small
firms and little product differentiation, each firm will have little
control over price. Because long-run equilibrium price will
equal the lowest possible average total cost,194 it follows that no
firm can compete if its costs are above those of its competi-
tors.195 Each firm must hold its costs even with those of its ri-
vals or face extinction. This forces firm management to obtain
the maximum output from each employee and employ the most
cost-effective means of production.
The assumption that firms will be cost minimizers, how-
ever, may not coincide with reality in more concentrated mar-
kets. In such markets, the economic models postulate that
price will rise above competitive levels, thus yielding economic
profits to the oligopolists.196 If firms receive relatively high
profits, intuition suggests that management will have less in-
centive to seek cost-improving methods and may permit some
slack in operations. 9 7 The difference between the costs of pro-
duction under conditions conducive to slackness in manage-
ment and those that would be incurred under conditions of
perfect competition is the X-inefficiency.19 8 It can exist when-
ever management is able to accept less than the maximum out-
put per worker or less than the most efficient means of
production and still obtain satisfactory profits, 99 conditions
which suggest that price is above the competitive level. Thus,
in conditions approximating oligopoly, firms can enjoy modest
economic profits despite some X-inefficiency. Rather than
eliminate the X-inefficiency, management may prefer to incur
192. See generally Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency v. "X-Effciency' 56
AM. EcoN. REV. 392 (1966) (focusing an "nonallocative efficiencies").
193. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 141-44, 167.
194. See id. at 257-58.
195. See id.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 37 and 50-51.
197. See I CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAviORAL THEORY OF THE FRMm 36-38
(1963).
198. See Leibenstein, supra note 192, at 406-07.
199. See Leibenstein, X-Ineffciency Xists-Reply to an Xorcis4 68 AM.
EcoN. REV. 203, 205 (1978).
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costs that raise entry barriers to potential entrants.200
The presence of X-inefficiency indicates that the marginal
cost and average cost curves currently facing the industry are
higher than those that minimize costs.201 This implies that an
industry with X-inefficiency could produce the same output
from fewer inputs. 202 To the extent that market structure dif-
fers from perfect competition, firms will have less incentive to
minimize their inputs, which may result in poorer industry per-
formance.203 Thus, the social loss due to excessive concentra-
tion is not only the allocative inefficiency postulated by the
traditional economic models but also any X-inefficiency. 204 If
X-inefficiency already exists, a horizontal merger may aggra-
vate the problem by enabling greater slack in operations or by
decreasing the incentive to find more efficient methods of pro-
duction. An increase in concentration in an industry with some
entry barriers may cause only a slight increase in allocative
200. Id.
201. See Leibenstein, spra note 192, at 412.
202. See Leibenstein, supra note 199, at 205.
203. Id. at 205-06.
204. Assume the noncompetitive industry illustrated in Figure 3 charges a
price of P. If the average total cost curve is fairly flat and approximately equal
to the marginal cost curve, triangle ABC represents the estimated amount of
allocative inefficiency. See supra note 38. If more aggressive competition in the
industry would force the firms to produce the same output at lower costs, the
shaded area between the X-inefficient cost curve ATC and the X-efficient aver-
age total cost curve ATC 1 represents the X-inefficiency. Moreover, allocative
inefficiency is not the estimated triangle ABC but the larger triangle ADE. See
W. SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET PowER: ANTrrRUsT, REGULATION,
AND PuBUc ENTERPPisE, 58-59 (1975).
Price
d
p A
F /B\C MC = ATC
G D E MC = ATC1
d
Quantity
Figure 3
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inefficiency but a much larger amount of X-inefficiency.2 05
Incorporating an X-inefficiency factor into merger analysis,
however, would confront decisionmakers with the same prob-
lem of identification the Department undoubtedly encountered
in attempting to devise guidelines that protect efficient merg-
ers-no economic theory or study permits one to predict when
a merger will result in either of these performance phenom-
ena.20 6 This should not be important when the structural con-
ditions of an industry clearly indicate the presence or absence
of market power. Rather, it is in those markets in between the
unconcentrated and highly concentrated ones, where there is
less certainty about the likely performance effects of a merger,
that efficiency and X-inefficiency will have their greatest im-
pact on the choice of concentration and market share criteria.
The Department's new Guidelines apparently assume that
mergers in this middle group will either be neutral or create
net efficiencies. In order to maximize the total number of effi-
cient mergers, the Department ignores the possibility that
some mergers in this middle group may be X-inefficient. It
seems more likely that mergers falling within this middle group
will consist of three types: efficient mergers, neutral mergers,
and X-inefficient mergers. No one, including the Department's
lawyers, can know a priori under which of these categories a
proposed merger will fall. By electing to permit most mergers
in moderately concentrated markets, the Department obviously
has made a philosophical choice to protect all possible efficien-
cies even at the expense of permitting some inefficiency. 207
205. See Leibenstein, supra note 192, at 399. The X-inefficiency caused by a
merger includes not only any resulting slack in operations but also the lower
productivity in the future resulting from a decreased incentive to innovate. See
Leibenstein, Organizational or Frictional Equilibria, X-Efficiency, and the Rate
oflnnovation, 83 Q.J. EcoN. 600, 600-23 (1969).
206. See supra note 160. No empirical evidence exists for the effect of a
merger on X-inefficiency, but one study indicates that natural monopolies may
contain X-inefficiency of 11%. See Primeaux, An Assessment of X-Efficiency
Gained Through Competition, 59 REV. ECON. STATIMTCS 105, 107 (1977).
207. The Guidelines indicate that the Justice Department wishes to chal-
lenge "competitively harmful" mergers while allowing beneficial or neutral
ones. See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4501. The Department has indicated that
mergers in industries with a postmerger HI less than 1000 are within "safe
harbors." See Guidelines, supra note 1, 4503.101; Justice Department Unveils
Long-Awaited Revisions to Merger Guidelines, supra note 162, at 1252. The De-
partment is "unlikely" to challenge mergers in "moderately" concentrated in-
dustries, those with post-merger HI values between 1000 and 1800, if the
increase in the HBI is less than 100. The Department will challenge mergers
increasing the Hi by more than 100 points only if the Guidelines' other factors
indicate that the merger will facilitate collusion. See supra notes 84-86 and ac-
companying text.
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The actual frequency of efficient mergers is not known.208
But even if they are common, the Department's new merger
policy fails to recognize that businesses can often attain the de-
sired efficiencies through more salutary means. The primary
efficiency associated with merger is economies of scale.209
Through merger, two small firms can combine their resources
to obtain the cost advantages of larger sized firms.2 10 But
merger is not the only means by which small firms can obtain
the advantages attributable to size. In most cases, firms can
duplicate the economies of scale sought through merger by in-
ternal expansion.21 1 Moreover, from an antitrust point of view,
internal expansion is preferable to merger since internal ex-
pansion does not result in eliminating a competitor from the
market.
The above analysis suggests that the concern of merger
policy in moderately concentrated markets should be the re-
verse of that reflected in the Department's new Guidelines.
Rather than attempting to protect efficient mergers, the draft-
ers should have been concerned with preventing inefficient
ones. By giving maximum weight to the efficiency factor and
none to X-inefficiency, the 1982 Guidelines have departed from
the strict antimerger philosophy that precipitated the enact-
ment of the 1950 amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act.212
208. See supra note 160.
209. See D. NEEDHAM, supra note 15, at 263. Economies of scale occur when
size permits the long-run average total cost curve to be at a minimum. Thus
the firm produces its output at the lowest price per unit possible. See Note,
Economies of Scale: Weighing Operating Efficiency When Enforcing Antitrust
Law, 49 FoRDHAM L. REV. 771, 775 (1981).
210. See supra note 12.
211. See D. NEEDHAM, supra note 15, at 263; F. ScHn.ns, supra note 15, at
472; Heflebower, Discussion, PAPERS & PROc. OF THE 81ST AN1rAL MEETING OF
THE AM. ECON. ASS'N, 59 AM. EcoN. REV. 119, 121 (1969).
The burden of proof is on those that argue that mergers improve alloca-
tive efficiency; so far reliable supporting evidence is lacking .... In
contrast it has not been shown clearly in these cases that the acquiring
firm could not more slowly, but probably more certainly, achieve the
economic efficiency results by internal expansion.
Heflebower, supra, at 121. See also 4 P. AREEDA & D. TumRN, supra note 4,
946c, at 164 (internal expansion is preferred when price is above the competi-
tive level). But see Rethwisch, A Note on the Presumed Social Desirability of
Internal Over External Growth, 14 ANTrrRUST BuLu. 855 (1969) (suggesting that
conglomerate mergers may result in greater efficiency than direct entry).
212. Two commentators summarized the philosophy of the 1950 amend-
ments as follows: 'qTe legislative history suggests that otherwise doubtful or
ambiguous situations were to be resolved in favor of a strict antimerger policy.
Congress probably was willing to risk losing at least some efficiency to be very
sure that it prevented the corporate acquisition of market power." Fisher &
Lande, supra note 160, at Section IL See also United States v. Marine Bancor-
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B. A PROPOSAL FOR MORE PREDICTABLE GUIDELINES THAT
REFLECT X-INEFFICIENCY
This Note recommends the following as more appropriate
guidelines for horizontal merger analysis in an agreed upon
market:
The Justice Department will challenge a merger if
a) the merger increases the Herflndahl-Hirschman Index by more
than 50 points in an industry with a postmerger index of at least
1250, or the merger increases the Herflndahl-Hirschman Index by
more than 100 points in an industry with a postmerger index below
1250; and
b) the industry has moderate to substantial barriers to entry; and
c) total costs of firms in the market exceed $200 million.
In addition to these guidelines, the Justice Department will challenge
any merger increasing the Herflndahl-Hirschman Index by 200 points
or more if some barriers to entry exist.
These guidelines are simple and, for any defined market, easily
calculated. Moreover, they eliminate the complex and unneces-
sary "tiebreakers" analysis of the 1982 Justice Department
Guidelines. Although the Department's "other factors" might
provide a clue to the level of competition in a particular indus-
try, they should not influence the initial determination of
whether to challenge a merger.2 13 Under this proposal, busi-
ness firms would not need to assess these factors in order to
predict the Justice Department's likely response to a merger.
The proposed guidelines rest on two basic premises. First,
the proposal recognizes that some causal relationship exists
between structure, conduct, and performance in all market
structures. As market structure becomes more concentrated,
performance suffers as a result of increased market power and
decreased desire to eliminate X-inefficiency. Second, the pro-
posal adopts the philosophy that it is better to forgo some ben-
eficial mergers in order to prevent as many inefficient ones as
possible. If this policy errs in predicting the effects of a merger,
poration, 418 U.S. 602, 622 (1974) ("§ 7 was designed to arrest mergers 'at a time
when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce [is] still in
its incipiency' "); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 344 ("Congress
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the main-
tenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing
considerations in favor of decentralization.").
213. These proposed guidelines indicate only whether the Justice Depart-
ment will challenge a merger. They still allow firms to show, during pre-trial or
trial, that other aspects of the market tend to make this three-pronged test an
unreliable indicator of performance in that particular industry. In this respect,
the proposed guidelines follow the prima facie case approach suggested in
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) and United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 631 (1974).
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it will err as a restrictive policy that prevents some efficient
mergers, as opposed to the more liberal 1982 Guidelines which
err on the side of allowing some mergers that may increase X-
inefficiency or lead to the exercise of market power.
The proposed guidelines use the Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex despite its weaknesses 214 because of its advantages as a
summary and relative index.215 Since moderately concentrated
industries probably have some degree of X-inefficiency,2 16 the
proposal classifies industries in relation to an HI of 1250-the
value associated with an industry of eight equal-size firms. 2 17
An industry with eight equal-size firms should limit the market
power of each firm and provide enough aggressive competition
to keep X-inefficiency to a relatively low level.2 10
The 100 and 50 point thresholds reflect the avowed purpose
of the proposed guidelines-to disallow some efficient mergers
in order to prevent almost all inefficient ones.2 19 The lower
214. Sed mpura notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
1
217. Since 1 = N, where N represents the number of equivalent size
.HHI
firms, an HI of 1250 corresponds to an industry with eight equal-size firms.
See supra note 99.
218. The postmerger BMl- level and the permissible increases in the index
admittedly reflect somewhat arbitrary choices, but differences over the num-
bers in this proposal should not detract from the suggested approach. The pro-
posal depends not on having the 1250 HH definition of a more concentrated
market, but on defining some threshold where firms will have little market
power and an incentive to minimize X-inefficiency. The 1250 HI value repre-
sents a conservative threshold; Areeda and Turner suggest that interdependent
pricing may occur whenever the number of firms falls below 10 to 12. See 4 P.
ARREDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 910c, at 57-58.
219. Even with the lower permissible increases in the 11, the proposed
guidelines still allow mergers which would not increase concentration dramati-
cally. In an industry with a post-merger H=I below 1250, the proposed guide-
lines would allow mergers between firms with market shares of
Acquiring Acquired
5% 10%
lo% 5%
15% 3%3o%
20% 2%%
25% 2%
In more concentrated industries, where the post-merger HI is 1250 or above,
the 50 point limit would allow mergers between firms with market shares of
Acquiring Acquired
4% 6%
10% 2 %
15% 1%
20% 2.5%
25% 1%
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threshold in markets having an BHI in excess of 1250 reflects
the greater risk in more concentrated markets that a merger
will cause an increase in market power or X-inefficiency. Be-
cause greater concentration may permit more X-inefficiency,
the level of market power suggested by industry BHI alone
may understate the actual inefficiency in the industry.2 2 0 The
market share suggestions thus allow firms to merge under con-
ditions more restrictive than those of the 1982 Guidelines, con-
ditions which presumably would not affect the relative desire of
firms to produce the most output from given inputs.
Even if a merger is suspect under the proposed concentra-
tion and market share criteria, the Justice Department would
not challenge a merger unless entry is relatively difficult. In
considering ease of entry, the Department should evaluate the
extent to which entry requires large initial investments, 221 ac-
quisition of controlled inputs or patented production methods,
or significant product differentiation.222 The current Guide-
lines' emphasis on how many firms will enter in response to a
given price hike has less significance than the likelihood that
some firms will or will not enter.2 2 3 If current producers per-
ceive that new firms are entering the industry or will enter in
response to an increase in price or profits, the firms will have
less incentive to exercise market power and more incentive to
eliminate X-inefficiency. 224 Conversely, firms will be more
likely to exercise market power and allow more slack in opera-
tions as entry becomes more difficult.
The third prong of these guidelines measures annual total
costs in the industry in recognition of the importance of proper
allocation of enforcement resources.2 25 For a given level of wel-
Since twice the product of the market shares of the merging firms yields the
increase in HI, which firm acquires which is irrelevant to these guidelines.
The headings are meant only to facilitate comparison with the 1968 Guidelines.
See supra notes 68, 85 and 87 (comparison of the 1968 Guidelines and the 1982
Guidelines).
220. See supra text accompanying note 205.
221. Courts have measured barriers to entry in terms of the cost of a mini-
mum efficient scale plant. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393
U.S. 333, 336 (1969); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
222. Although the cost of constructing an efficient plant may give a prelimi-
nary indication of the difficuity of entry, a more accurate measure would also
include the additional costs of a new entrant to offset product differentiation
and control of inputs or production methods by other firms. See supra notes
172-81 and accompanying text.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83 and 193-95.
225. Landes and Posner also suggest a consideration of the social cost of an
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fare loss or X-inefficiency, larger markets have considerably
greater social costs. Using X-inefficiency as an example, if the
average total cost in a perfectly competitive industry would be
only 90% of actual industry costs, an industry with total costs
of $100 million has X-inefficiency of $10 million, while an indus-
try with total costs of $1 billion has X-inefficiency of $100 mil-
lion. The two industries have the same level of inefficiency, but
the larger one causes a greater misuse of resources.
The Justice Department should not challenge every merger
satisfying the first two prongs of the proposed guidelines, be-
cause the cost of challenging a merger in a very small market
may exceed its social cost in terms of increased inefficiency.22 6
Assuming that a merger exceeding the proposed guidelines in-
creases allocative inefficiency and X-inefficiency by 5% of total
costs, the net social cost of the merger in an industry with $200
million in total costs amounts to $10 million.22 7 Thus, the third
factor in the proposed merger analysis suggests that the Justice
Department challenge only those mergers with social costs, in-
cluding X-inefficiency, of at least $10 million.
The third prong of the proposed guidelines does not imply
that firms in very small markets may merge freely. The 200
point limit in the final section of the guidelines warns firms that
antitrust violation, but they limit their analysis to deadweight loss without con-
sidering the additional social cost of X-inefficiency. See Landes & Posner,
supra note 4, at 953-56.
226. This aspect of the proposal responds to Justice Harlan's concern that
the Justice Department not waste scarce resources challenging every merger
despite its effect on the economy. See United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank
& Trust, 399 U.S. 350, 373 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
227. The $10 million in social costs need not reflect an increase in allocative
inefficiency and X-inefficiency of 5% in one year. Rather it indicates that the
total future allocative and X-inefficiency caused by a merger will equal 5% of
costs in a single year.
This assumption that mergers increasing the HHI by more than the pro-
posed limits will cause allocative and X-inefficiency of 5% represents, of course,
a best guess. Although decreases in competitive pressure allow greater X-inef-
ficiency (see Leibenstein, supra note 192, at 398; Leibenstein, supra note 199, at
205-06), no empirical study indicates the effect of a merger on the level of X-
inefficiency. Studies have shown that X-inefficiency may constitute up to 25%
of total costs in some industries. See Leibenstein, supra note 192, at 399. See
also Primeaux, supra note 206, at 107 (estimating that natural monopolies may
have X-inefficiency of 11%). If, contrary to the "guestimate" made here, merg-
ers violating the proposed guidelines will increase allocative inefficiency and X-
inefficiency by only 3% of total costs, the social costs in an industry with $200
million in total costs would be $6 million. In such a case, the issue would be
whether $6 million in social costs justifies a challenge or whether the $200 mil-
lion minimum total costs requirement should be raised. In order to err on the
side of preventing greater allocative and X-inefficiency, these guidelines pre-
sume the higher inefficiency level of 5%.
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the Department will not ignore mergers creating market power
or X-inefficiency simply because they occur in small markets.
At the same time, the higher threshold for smaller markets rec-
ognizes that such industries frequently have lower entry barri-
ers, especially with respect to the absolute costs of entry.
V. CONCLUSION
The Department's adoption of the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index represents a major improvement over the four-firm con-
centration ratio of the former Guidelines. Although the rela-
tionship between structure, conduct, and performance is not as
clear under oligopoly conditions, economists have demon-
strated, under some oligopoly theories, a relationship between
the HHI of an industry and the degree of market power in the
industry as measured by the Lerner index. Thus, the HHI
value of an industry following a merger will yield an accurate
picture of the likely performance of that industry if the conduct
assumptions of the oligopoly theories are met.
While one may applaud the Department's selection of con-
centration measure, one may wonder, on the other hand, why
the Department did not recognize in its new Guidelines that
barriers to entry constitute an equally important element to the
successful exercise of market power even in highly concen-
trated markets. The new Guidelines consider entry barriers
only in moderately concentrated markets or in more highly
concentrated markets if the market shares aggregated by a
merger are relatively small. Unfortunately, when considering
them, the Department must use an unnecessarily complicated
method of calculating their extent.
The relationship between the Guidelines' "other factors"
and industry performance is more tenuous. Their addition
serves mainly to complicate the process of predicting whether
the Department is likely to challenge a merger and adds little
to the Guidelines' predictive value.
More importantly, however, the Guidelines reflect a delib-
erate choice to permit most mergers in other than highly con-
centrated markets on the assumption that mergers in these
markets will have no detrimental performance effects and may
achieve socially desirable efficiencies. In addition to the lack of
empirical data to support the efficiencies assumption, this ap-
proach also ignores the possibility that mergers in noncompeti-
tive markets are as, if not more, likely to increase inefficiency
by encouraging slack management and reducing incentive to
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innovate. The results are guidelines that are more lenient with
respect to most mergers than economic theory or the back-
ground to section 7 would justify.
This Note has suggested alternative horizontal merger
guidelines that, in contrast to the Department's new Guide-
lines, are simple, understandable, and easily calculated. The
proposed guidelines rest on the recognition that because eco-
nomic theory cannot adequately explain the causal relationship
between structure, conduct, and performance in oligopoly, a
good merger policy should err on the side of preventing some
beneficial mergers rather than allowing too many inefficient
ones. The proposal also recognizes the importance of allocating
the scarce resources of the Justice Department, so that enforce-
ment focuses only on those mergers causing the greatest social
loss.
